2 Connections

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The basis of IBC is the ability to verify in the on-chain consensus ruleset of chain B that a data packet received on chain B was correctly generated on chain A. This establishes a cross-chain linearity guarantee: upon validation of that packet on chain B we know that the packet has been executed on chain A and any associated logic resolved (such as assets being escrowed), and we can safely perform application logic on chain B (such as generating vouchers on chain B for the chain A assets which can later be redeemed with a packet in the opposite direction).

This section outlines the abstraction of an IBC connection: the state and consensus ruleset necessary to perform IBC packet verification.

2.1 Definitions

  • Chain A is the source blockchain from which the IBC packet is sent
  • Chain B is the destination blockchain on which the IBC packet is received
  • H_h is the signed header of chain A at height h
  • C_h is a subset of the consensus ruleset of chain A at height h
  • V_kh is the value stored on chain A under key k at height h
  • P is the unbonding period of chain P, in units of time
  • dt(a, b) is the time difference between events a and b

Note that of all these, only H_h defines a signature and is thus attributable.

2.2 Requirements

To facilitate an IBC connection, the two blockchains must provide the following proofs:

  1. Given a trusted H_h and C_h and an attributable update message U_h,
    it is possible to prove H_h' where C_h' == C_h and dt(now, H_h) < P
  2. Given a trusted H_h and C_h and an attributable change message X_h,
    it is possible to prove H_h' where C_h' /= C_h and dt(now, H_h) < P
  3. Given a trusted H_h and a Merkle proof M_kvh it is possible to prove V_kh

It is possible to make use of the structure of BFT consensus to construct extremely lightweight and provable messages U_h' and X_h'. The implementation of these requirements with Tendermint consensus is defined in Appendix E. Another algorithm able to provide equally strong guarantees (such as Casper) is also compatible with IBC but must define its own set of update and change messages.

The Merkle proof M_kvh is a well-defined concept in the blockchain space, and provides a compact proof that the key value pair (k, v) is consistent with a Merkle root stored in H_h. Handling the case where k is not in the store requires a separate proof of non-existence, which is not supported by all Merkle stores. Thus, we define the proof only as a proof of existence. There is no valid proof for missing keys, and we design the algorithm to work without it.

Blockchains supporting IBC must implement Merkle proof verification:

valid(H_h, M_kvh) ⇒ true | false

2.3 Connection Lifecycle

2.3.1 Opening a connection

All proofs require an initial H_h and C_h for some h, where dt(now, H_h) < P.

Establishing a bidirectional initial root-of-trust between the two blockchains (A to B and B to A) — H_ah and C_ah stored on chain B, and H_bh and C_bh stored on chain A — is necessary before any IBC packets can be sent.

Any header may be from a malicious chain (e.g. shadowing a real chain state with a fake validator set), so a subjective decision is required before establishing a connection. This can be performed permissionlessly, in which case users later utilizing the IBC channel must check the root-of-trust themselves, or authorized by on-chain governance for additional assurance.

2.3.2 Following block headers

We define two messages U_h and X_h, which together allow us to securely advance our trust from some known H_n to some future H_h where h > n. Some implementations may require that h == n + 1 (all headers must be processed in order). IBC implemented on top of Tendermint or similar BFT algorithms requires only that delta-vals(C_n, C_h) < ⅓ (each step must have a change of less than one-third of the validator set)[4].

Either requirement is compatible with IBC. However, by supporting proofs where h - n > 1, we can follow the block headers much more efficiently in situations where the majority of blocks do not include an IBC packet between chains A and B, and enable low-bandwidth connections to be implemented at very low cost. If there are packets to relay every block, these two requirements collapse to the same case (every header must be relayed).

Since these messages U_h and X_h provide all knowledge of the remote blockchain, we require that they not just be provable, but also attributable. As such, any attempt to violate the finality guarantees in headers posted to chain B can be submitted back to chain A for punishment, in the same manner that chain A would independently punish (slash) identified Byzantine actors.

More formally, given existing set of trust T = {(H_i, C_i), (H_j, C_j), …}, we must provide:

valid(T, X_h | U_h) ⇒ true | false | unknown

valid must fulfill the following properties:

if H_h-1 ∈ T then
  valid(T, X_h | U_h) ⇒ true | false
  ∃ (U_h | X_h) ⇒ valid(T, X_h | U_h)
if C_h ∉ T then
  valid(T, U_h) ⇒ false

We can then process update transactions as follows:

update(T, X_h | U_h) ⇒ success | failure

update(T, X_h | U_h) = match valid(T, X_h | U_h) with
  false ⇒ fail with "invalid proof"
  unknown ⇒ fail with "need a proof between current and h"
  true ⇒ 
    set T = T ∪ (H_h, C_h)

Define max(T) as max(h, where H_h ∈ T). For any T with max(T) == h-1, there must exist some X_h | U_h so that max(update(T, X_h | U_h)) == h. By induction, there must exist a set of proofs, such that max(update…(T,...)) == h + n for any n.

Bisection can be used to discover this set of proofs. That is, given max(T) == n and valid(T, X_h | U_h) == unknown, we then try update(T, X_b | U_b), where _b == (h + n) / 2. The base case is where valid(T, X_h | U_h) == true and is guaranteed to exist if h == max(T) + 1.

2.3.3 Closing a connection

IBC implementations may optionally include the ability to close an IBC connection and prevent further header updates, simply causing update(T, X_h | U_h) as defined above to always return false.

Closing a connection may break application invariants (such as fungiblity - token vouchers on chain B will no longer be redeemable for tokens on chain A) and should only be undertaken in extreme circumstances such as Byzantine behavior of the connected chain.

Closure may be permissioned to an on-chain governance system, an identifiable party on the other chain (such as a signer quorum, although this will not work in some Byzantine cases), or any user who submits an application-specific fraud proof. When a connection is closed, application-specific measures may be undertaken to recover assets held on a Byzantine chain. We defer further discussion to Appendix D.

Last Updated: 8/14/2018, 5:05:11 PM